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Abstract 
 
  This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law, at the International Hellenic 
University. 
  Initially, the development of European Insolvency Law is presented; the 
harmonization attempts and some indicative national legislation examples from 
Germany and France. In the next chapters, the history of the relevant U.S.A. Law is 
cited and the dynamic role it has played in reforming other national Insolvency Law 
systems is underlined, as well as its important legal mechanisms for company 
restructuring. The chapters to follow attempt to present differences and similarities 
between Europe and the U.S.A. in the field of insolvency procedures through case law 
and more specifically by examining two cases of well-known bankruptcies. In the end, 
there is an effort to connect the legal aspects of the subject with the economic ones, 
by collecting information on the matter of how the two basic options that are offered 
to companies (liquidation and reorganization) affect the economy and what results do 
they produce. 
  My expectations from this dissertation are to be able to show from my limited law 
practice, but mainly from my research that Insolvency Law is a very fast-paced and 
progressively harmonized legal sector, in close relation to economy, that can actually 
play a significant role in reforming unsound companies and unstable economies if 
jurisdictions around the world follow the innovative U.S.A. model and focus on the 
rebuilding of companies, the reorganization of debts, the maintenance of employee 
positions and not on the short-term liquidation option that Europe tended to prefer 
some years ago. 
  This academic work is the result of the great collaboration I had throughout the 
previous months with my supervisor, Professor Pavlos Masouros, who contributed 
with his knowledge and useful guidance providing me with very interesting scientific 
articles and extremely helpful methodological advice. Furthermore, I would like to 
attribute acknowledgements to Professor Georgia Mpechri – Kechagioglou, whose 
great teaching of Insolvency Law during my bachelor’s degree years created a solid 
foundation for me as a starting point and inspired me to study this area of law further 
 
 
more. Last but not least, I would like to thank Professor Athanasios Kaissis for being a 
very supportive academic mentor and being very close to all LL.M. students, helping us 
with every problem we encountered through this difficult but also very fruitful period 
of the master’s programme. 
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Preface 
 
  Being a law student and a trainee lawyer during the financial crisis years in Greece, 
the initiative to investigate more the challenging and always evolving legal field of 
corporate insolvencies came as a very natural consequence to my academic interests. 
As a young legal scientist, even from my bachelor’s degree years, I was fascinated by 
the way every country’s insolvency laws are closely connected to its policies and by the 
way they incorporate the general economic principles of every legal and financial 
system. Furthermore, the law office where I am currently doing my traineeship 
handles several cases of individual and corporate bankruptcies, so I usually have the 
chance to observe the relevant legal procedures, study the Greek laws and follow the 
latest developments. 
  The basic difficulty I encountered during my research was the studying of the 
American legislation and case law, as it is a common law jurisdiction and therefore an 
unfamiliar area for me as a civil law practitioner. 
  Nevertheless, my aim was to gain a complete view of the topic by studying the legal 
texts (the European Conventions and Regulations, national insolvency legislation from 
EU Member-States, the U.S.A. Bankruptcy Code etc), handling a thorough part of legal 
literature, searching important European and American case law and reading legal and 
economic researches -both academic and non-academic- and press articles (from the 
European Commission, INSOL Europe, GTAI, the American Bankruptcy Institute, the 
World Economic Outlook etc). 
  Closing, I would have to admit that my topic covers a very broad area, but I strongly 
believe in this academic idea, upon which the scientific interest has started to grow 
during the last years1, and I think that I have worked on it efficiently. 
 
 
Today, certain people file for bankruptcy, businesses and individuals, and it no longer has the 
stigma it once had. Now it’s almost considered wise, a way to regroup and come back again. 
David Dinkins, American politician 
                                                 
1 Horst Eidenmuller, ‘Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law’ (2016) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2799863 accessed 1 September 2016 page 2 
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1. Introduction. Methodology, Academic Objective and Expected Contribution 
 
  This dissertation aims to highlight the different philosophies behind two classically 
different legal regimes in the field of Corporate Insolvency Law, which in a slow but 
stable way tends to be globally harmonized, as more and more companies become 
active worldwide. The more creditor-‘friendly’ European approach and the more 
debtor-‘friendly’ U.S.A. approach are stressed and a humble effort is carried out in 
order to indicate this in the actual competitiveness of the two markets and to show 
how Europe’s latest legislative reforms are on the U.S.A.’s path2. 
  The dissertation initially presents the evolution of European Insolvency Law, from the 
Istanbul Convention and the European Insolvency Regulation to the EU Recast 
Regulation and also some indicative national legislation. Then, the progress of U.S.A.’s 
Insolvency Law is cited, from the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act to the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
and the U.S.A. Bankruptcy Code of today, analyzing Chapters 7 and 11. Conclusions on 
the European and the American legal ‘families’ are drawn, based on their promotion of 
liquidation or reorganization and their procedural provisions and also some general 
characteristics regarding their debtor or creditor-‘friendliness’ are underlined3. 
  Further on, the dissertation proceeds with the presentation of two well-known 
corporate bankruptcies from a legal perspective, highlighting the aforementioned 
conclusions. 
  The last chapter is structured around the argument that reorganization, as found in 
common law regimes and especially in the U.S.A., is proven to be more beneficial for a 
market and for socio-economic development4. 
  This area of law is very challenging as, on the one hand it is an independent legal field 
and on the other hand it has important corporate, civil, public and criminal aspects. 
Furthermore, today’s approach doesn’t view corporate and insolvency law as two 
                                                 
2 Vera Jourova, ‘Insolvency Law in Europe - Giving People and Businesses a Second Chance’ (European 
Commission, 23 April 2015) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-
2019/jourova/announcements/insolvency-law-europe-giving-people-and-businesses-second-chance_en 
accessed 11 September 2016 
3 Harley Hahn, ‘Liquidation or Reorganization? Understanding Bankruptcy. Part 5 of 7’ Independent. 
Santa Barbara. Who. What. Now. (Santa Barbara, 5 May 2013)  
4 ‘Out of Pocket. Europe’s Flawed Insolvency Regimes will Face a Severe Test in 2009’ The Economist 
(Paris, 30 December 2008)  
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completely separate legal areas, as such an approach would create more legal 
problems to solve. Their provisions should not be contradictory and similar legal tools 
should be used. 
  I also think that young lawyers who practice law on this field should support the view 
that insolvency doesn’t end commercial activity but it is a chance for a fresh and 
rational beginning for a company, since there are many legal tools at our disposal 
today. All the above are issues that are put under examination by the legal 
practitioners and academics of today and I hope I have handled them thoroughly.
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2. History of European Insolvency Law. Efforts of Harmonization and Basic Legal 
Texts 
 
  The establishment of a unified legal framework for individual and corporate 
insolvencies in the European Union has always been crucial as the economic activities 
among Member-States are a common phenomenon5. Even today though, we cannot 
talk about a unified body of substantive and procedural laws that apply to all Member-
States. The efforts towards this direction are difficult to succeed because insolvency 
law is a legal area that depends on various socio-economic factors; therefore, it cannot 
easily be harmonized, even within the Union6. The basis of all these efforts has been 
Article 220 of the old version of the EEC Treaty (ex Article 293 EC Treaty)7, which reads 
as follows: ‘The Member-States shall, so as far as is necessary, enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals the 
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.’8. 
  On this basis, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters was published in 1968, excluding from its 
scope matters related to insolvency, as a subject requiring special treatment (Article 
1)9. As the intra-Community commerce continued to grow, the Draft EEC Bankruptcy 
Convention was composed in 1970 and amended in 1980 based on the universality 
model of one legal text regulating all Member-States10 but unfortunately it was 
abandoned five years later. In 1987 the Commission introduced the Draft Liquidation 
Directive but as the national legal systems presented similarity on liquidation matters, 
it wasn’t adopted as well. Among its aims was also the protection of all creditors in 
                                                 
5 ‘Insolvency Proceedings’ (European Commission, 24 September 2016) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/index_en.htm accessed 29 September 2016 
6 W-G Ringe, L Gullifer and P Théry, Current Issues in European Financial and Insolvency Law. 
Perspectives from France and U.K. (Hart 2009) page 198 
7 Bob Wessels, 'The European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast). The First 
Commentaries' (2016) 13 European Company Law 
8 Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (first published 2006, Europa 
Law Publishing 2012) page 88 
9 Klaus Pannen, European Insolvency Regulation (De Gruyter Recht 2007) pages 8-11 
10 M Patakyova and B Gramblicková, 'Bankruptcy and Liquidation. Current Legal Situation in European 
and International Context. Solutions Under the European Model Company Act (EMCA)' (2016) 13 
European Company and Financial Law Review pages 328-329 
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cross-border investments. In 1995 the Draft EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 
was produced in Strasbourg, aiming to solve the previous problems but England 
refused to sign it due to political reasons, so it never came into force11. This convention 
was following the principle of universalism too, which usually benefits creditors’ 
collection actions12. After all these failures, the European Insolvency Convention was 
drafted in Istanbul in 1990 (Convention on Certain International Aspects of 
Bankruptcy) following the concept of modified universalism and rejecting the absolute 
universalism of the past13. Nevertheless, it was ratified by only one country. Gradually, 
the idea of a Convention was abandoned and the notion of a Regulation was adopted. 
In 2000 the European Insolvency Regulation (1346/2000) was published, based on ex 
Articles 65 and 67 of the EC Treaty (Article 81 TFEU). 
  The abovementioned Regulation is a Community Act with general force on all 
Member-States, except Denmark14, regulating intra-Community cross-border 
insolvency procedures. The national laws still remain distinctive, so it is basically a 
conflict of laws system and it is also important to notice that the negative term of 
‘bankruptcy’ is abandoned. Its provisions refer to the applicable law (Articles 4, 28 etc), 
the recognition and enforcement of court decisions (Articles 16, 17 etc), the definition 
of COMI (Recital 13) etc. Among its goals are also the elimination of forum-shopping 
and the acceleration of the procedures, which provide the legal text with a clear pro-
creditor character. 
  The provisions that better underline this legal text’s philosophy are the ones that 
refer to creditors (Articles 27-38 and 39-42). More specifically, upon the 
commencement of insolvency procedures the court or the trustee are obliged to notify 
the creditors that are in a different Member-State without any delay (Article 40.1) and 
                                                 
11 Bob Wessels, ‘European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings’ (2001) November 2001 
American Bankruptcy Institute Journal  
12 Gerard McCormack, 'Something Old, Something New. Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation' 
(2016) 79 The Modern Law Review 
13 Jona Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation. A Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings in the Light of a Paradigm of Cooperation and a Comitas Europaea (Intersentia 
2005) pages 2-3 
13 Lampros E Kotsiris, Evropaiko Emporiko Dikaio (first published 2003, Ekdoseis Sakkoula 2010) pages 
1082-1083 
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the creditors, who can even be public social insurance and tax authorities (Article 39), 
must receive a notice with all the necessary information (Article 40.2). Furthermore a 
creditor, even if he has declared his notice in the main proceedings, he can declare a 
notice in the secondary proceedings as well (Articles 32.1, 32.2)15. Generally, a 
procedure structured around creditors’ best interests is noticeable. Furthermore, pre-
insolvency and voluntary procedures are left out of the Regulation’s scope. 
  Ten years after the Regulation’s implementation and having the advantage of many 
empirical examples, the legislators adopted an approach focusing on business 
maintenance, without of course disfavoring creditors’ claims1617 (see the Commission’s 
proposal 2012/0360) and in 2015 the Regulation was reformed by the European 
Insolvency Regulation (Recast - 2015/848), as part of the 2020 EU Strategy on 
economic growth. The amendments were mainly the following: an extension of the 
period that is within its scope in order to include pre-insolvency proceedings, the grant 
of a broader meaning to the terms of ‘COMI’ and ‘establishment’ and the introduction 
of a new regime for insolvent group companies in order to promote cooperation 
between member companies and therefore, to have more possibilities of rescue18. 
  In the same year the European Model Company Act (EMCA) was published as well. It 
is a model law statute regulating corporate law issues and introducing flexibility1920, as 
it is affected by the U.K. law.  
  During the last years Europe, under the pressure of the economic crisis and the 
U.S.A.’s example, is changing its approach to economic distress21. Some specific 
                                                 
15 Lampros E Kotsiris, Evropaiko Emporiko Dikaio (first published 2003, Ekdoseis Sakkoula 2010)  pages 
1137-1139 
16 Ruprecht Karls Universitat Heidelberg and Universitat Wien, External Evaluation on Regulation No. 
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (JUST/2011/JCIVPR/0049/A4, 2011) page 10 
17 G S Moss, I F Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceeding. A Commentary and 
Annotated Guide (first published 2002, Oxford University Press 2009) pages 266-267 
18 H Anderson and R Oliver, ‘The Recast EC Regulation  on Insolvency (2015/848 of 20 May 2015)’ 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, July 2015) 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/130414/the-recast-ec-regulation-on-
insolvency-regulation-2015848-of-20-may-2015 accessed 19 September 2016 
19 Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘The New European Model Company Act’ (Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 14 October 2015) 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/14/the-new-european-model-company-act/ accessed 21 
September 2016 
20 M Patakyová and B Gramblicková, 'Bankruptcy and Liquidation. Current Legal Situation in European 
and International Context. Solutions Under the European Model Company Act (EMCA)' (2016) 13 
European Company and Financial Law Review pages 324, 348-350 
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examples are the following: In 2016, the ‘Insolvency Initiative’ was launched, as an 
effort to develop legal mechanisms that allow viable but distressed companies to 
continue operating. In the same year, a conference was organized in Brussels by the 
Commission addressing similar subjects and the official Study on a New Approach to 
Business Failure and Insolvency was published, stressing the objective of more 
entrepreneurial chances and market stability, based on Commission’s official 
Recommendation (C 2014/150022). All the above are encouraging examples and prove 
the international dialogue that is inevitably produced by the diversity of legal 
systems23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
21 Deborah Ball, ‘Europe Builds Own Chapter 11. Amid Tough Times, Countries Across the Continent Are 
Reshaping Bankruptcy‘ The Wall Street Journal (New York, 5 April 2013) 
22 Lampros E Kotsiris, Ptoxeutiko Dikaio (first published 1998, Ekdoseis Sakkoula 2016) page 90 
23 Horst Eidenmuller, ‘Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law’ (2016) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2799863 accessed 15 September 2016 page 29 
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3. Insolvency Regimes of Today in European Union’s Member States. Indicative 
Examples 
 
  As mentioned above, a European Bankruptcy Code with common substantial and 
procedural laws doesn’t exist but there are Regulations and Directives contributing 
towards a common legal framework with the main objective of minimizing possible 
differentiations between national laws that would be problematic to the intra-EU 
commerce. 
  What is important is that national insolvency laws within the Union have similar 
features and in the following chapters a short analysis on the relevant laws of two 
Member-States is presented.   
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3.1. Germany. A Conservative Model Entering a Different Path? 
 
  Germany’s insolvency legislation may not be the basis for as many jurisdictions as 
France, but Germany is Europe’s largest economy and therefore, it affects other 
jurisdictions in multiple ways. Konkursordnung (KO) of 1877, amended in 1898, was 
the Law regulating all insolvency matters and Vergleichsordnung (VglO) was a 
procedure introduced much later, in 1935, regulating a judicial settlement aiming to 
the viability of the company in distress. Many reform efforts had been made and in 
1994 the Insolvenzordnung (InsO), amended in 2003, was introduced which is 
Germany’s current body of laws regarding insolvency24. 
  The German Bankruptcy Code, is mainly focused on the collective reparation of 
creditors, as Article 1 InsO declares: ‘The insolvency proceedings shall serve the 
purpose of collective satisfaction of a debtor’s creditors by liquidation of the debtor’s 
assets and by distribution of the proceeds, or by reaching an arrangement in an 
insolvency plan, particularly in order to maintain the enterprise. Honest debtors shall 
be given the opportunity to achieve discharge of residual debt.’25. There is a contrast in 
Germany being one of the largest economies and on the other hand being 
‘conservative’ in this field26. Insolvency in Germany carries a very negative stigma and 
this is underlined by the word ‘Schlud’ (debt) which also means guilt and blame. As a 
matter of fact, many companies moved their centre of main interests to countries such 
as the U.K. in order to benefit from the variety of their restructuring mechanisms. 
  In the general procedure, the debtor or his creditors can apply for the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings upon a situation of present or future 
illiquidity (Zahlungsunfähigkeit) or over-indebtness (Überschuldung) according to 
Article 13.1 InsO and the process is divided in preliminary (vorläufiges 
Insolvenzverfahren) and final proceedings. The first stage is supervised by a court-
appointed preliminary administrator (Eigenverwaltung) and a preliminary creditors’ 
                                                 
24 Shumaker, Loop and Kendrick LLP, Pinsent Masons LLP and Taylor Wessing LLP, Insolvency Laws in 
Germany, U.K. and the U.S.. A Comparative Law Analysis for Trade Creditors (2013) page 3 
25 J Armour, S Deakin, P Lele and M M Siems, 'How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence From A Cross-
Country Comparison Of Shareholder, Creditor And Worker Protection' (2009) 57 American Journal of 
Comparative Law pages 27-28 
26 Sacha Lurken, ‘One Year Later. Germany’s Corporate Insolvency Law Reform Turns Out Success Story’ 
Financier Worldwide (Birmingham, May 2013) 
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committee (Gläubigerausschuß). These proceedings last from the filing day until the 
court decision is published and if it is decided that there are grounds for insolvency 
and that the assets are sufficient in order to cover the procedural costs, the final 
proceedings are opened27. 
  During the final proceedings, the final administrator is appointed (80 InsO), who takes 
on the company’s management28 and reports on its financial situation. His role is of 
great significance, as he decides upon entering or terminating transactions, he 
proposes the dissolution or continuation of the company etc. After his report is 
published, the first creditors’ meeting (Gläubigerversammlung) takes place according 
to Article 29.1 InsO, in which the company’s liquidation or restructuring will be voted 
upon. The creditors’ meeting and the committee are two organs of decisive role and 
they decide by majority -in number and value-. More specifically, the committee 
represents creditor autonomy that was introduced in German Law by Konkursordnung 
and many powers are attributed to it, such as deciding upon the administrator (59 
InsO), commenting on the administrator’s report (156 InsO), attributing to the 
preparation of a reorganization plan (218 InsO), requesting liquidation (233 InsO) etc. 
  The option of an insolvency plan (Insolvenzplan) is followed when the aim is the 
company’s preservation. The petition can be filed by either the debtor or the 
administrator and if it is approved, the creditors will receive payment according to the 
plan’s terms. The plan has to be approved by the court and by the majority of each 
creditors’ class -in number and value- (244 InsO) in order to be enforceable (231, 248 
InsO). This procedure is not followed very often despite the fact that Germany’s 
traditional model has evolved since 1970 and that it now bears similarities to the 
English one29. The Insolvenzplan is available only when insolvency is already faced or 
there is a serious future threat, which may be late for a successful restructuring and 
also the preliminary creditors’ committee can very easily vote against it. It is also true 
that the law doesn’t necessarily declare reorganization as a plan’s aim as for example 
                                                 
27 M Wilhelm, M Richter and S Skoruppa, German Insolvency Law. An Overview (2016) pages 1-5 
28 E Warren and J L Westbrook, ‘The Success of Chapter 11. A Challenge to the Critics’ (2009) 107 
Michigan Law Review page 626 
29 P Sarkar and S Deakin, 'Does Creditor Protection Matter? Legal and Financial Development in Four 
OECD Countries. 1970-2005' (2015) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613879 accessed 17 October 2016 page 6 
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in Chapter 11 of the U.S.A. Bankruptcy Code, so liquidation may still be followed in the 
end. 
  Self-administration (Eigenverwaltung) is another procedure, similar to U.S.A.’s 
debtor-in-possession regime (240 InsO), which allows the company to remain under its 
previous management’s control with the parallel supervision of a trustee (Sachwalter) -
it can be invoked at any time if the Court judges that it will have a negative effect on 
creditors or if the creditors’ meeting doesn’t approve it-. Also, many of the insolvency 
administrator’s duties such as the challenging of contracts are transferred to the 
trustee and not the debtor. In fact, very detailed preparation is required, the debtor 
needs to gain his largest creditors’ support and sometimes to even appoint new 
management with restructuring experience for the success of the procedure. 
  For the new option of Umbrella Proceedings (Schutzschirmverfahren) an insolvency 
plan petition and a petition for self-administration have to be combined and the 
debtor is granted three months in order to prepare a plan under the supervision of a 
trustee and a legal expert  (270.a-c InsO)30. A stay of individual claims is applied upon 
the debtor’s motion to the Court and not automatically (38, 52, 87 InsO). Another 
important element is that it can be followed only under the condition that the debtor 
is not yet illiquid. This procedure wasn’t very attractive to companies in the past, as it 
was slow and not really beneficial (only one percent of companies used to apply for 
it)31 and despite 2012’s reform32 and the positive effects of eliminating the costs and 
taking advantage of the company’s know-how, the courts are still reluctant to accept 
it. 
  It is also important to notice the simplicity of the creditors’ ranking system, which 
proves that their reparation is in the centre of the German insolvency legislation: 
preferential creditors are ranked first followed by secured creditors, administrative 
expenses, unsecured creditors, subordinated creditors and shareholders (222, 234 
                                                 
30 S Block-Lieb, J Alexander and E Kovalenko, ‘Representing the Interests of Unsecured Creditors. A 
Comparative Look at UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2009) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337824 accessed 16 October 2016 pages 15-17 
31 Samuel Bufford, ‘Revision of the European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. 
Recommendations’ (2012) 3 International Insolvency Law Review pages 14-15 
32 G Glorfeld and F von Kaltenborn-Stachau, ‘Self Administration’ (RSM) 
https://www.rsmgermany.de/en/what-we-offer/by-service/restructuring/self-administration.html 
accessed 24 October 2016 
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InsO)33. Preferential claims (Massegläubiger) derive from economic activity with the 
administrator after the opening of the proceedings. They get satisfied before the 
insolvency creditors and they are granted individual enforcement rights. Secured 
creditors may have rights in rem or intellectual property rights and they are not 
considered to be insolvency creditors as well, therefore they have individual 
enforcement rights but only upon a specific asset. In the same category there also are 
creditors holding a special right on an asset, enabling them to demand preferential 
satisfaction from the proceeds of its sale (Absonderung). They are insolvency creditors 
though and any individual enforcement right they may have is under restrictions. The 
unsecured creditors must file their claims in order to register them and they get paid 
last. 
  Employees enjoy protection from ‘insolvency money’ (Insolvenzgeld), which covers 
their three-month wages. Their agreements, as long-term contracts, are usually not 
terminated, only possibly altered, according to a plan34. On the other hand, the 
administrator is entitled to decide upon the continuation or not of the pending 
transactions and the counterparty cannot claim payment but only compensation.  
  Germany introduced important reforms that empowered business restructuring 
which had previously been a rare option (ex according to the ‘consolidation plan’ of 
the past, creditors should be offered at least 35% of their claims and no stay of claims 
was imposed). In 2009 the suspension of enforcement actions against insolvency 
assets that are necessary to the debtor’s company was allowed by law35 and in 2010 
the Act on the Implementation of Measures to Stabilize the Financial Market 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz) was introduced, according to which it wasn’t 
obligatory anymore for viable companies to file for insolvency in cases of over-
indebtedness. In 2012 a legislative effort for the reform of business rehabilitation was 
presented (Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen, ESUG-
InsO) which also aimed to the protection of shareholders’ rights, the trustee’s 
                                                 
33 Horst Eidenmuller, ‘Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law’ (2016) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2799863 accessed 31 October 2016 pages 16-18 
34 Rudiger Litten, ‘A Quick Overview on German Insolvency Law’ (Norton Rose Fulbright, December 
2008) http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/18593/a-quick-overview-on-
german-insolvency-law accessed 23 October 2016 
35 Iraj Hashi, ‘The Economics of Bankruptcy, Reorganization and Liquidation. Lessons for East European 
Transitional Economies’ (1995) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1479548 accessed 31 October 2016 page 12 
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independency, the strengthening of the creditors’ role in reorganization, the 
harmonization of insolvency and corporate law, the institution of a protective process 
for companies which still have liquidity, the enhancement of employees’ voting rights 
and more3637. Another improvement of 2012 was the law on the restructuring of 
financial institutions (Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von 
Kreditinstituten, zur Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds fur Kreditinstitute und 
zur Verlangerung der Verjahrungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung-
Restrukturierungsgesetz) which introduced special restructuring proceedings, the 
establishment of a restructuring fund etc38. Such reforms provide the legislator with 
more mechanisms and bring German Insolvency Law closer to U.S.A.’s Chapter 1139. 
  Other changes brought by the latest reforms were the creditors’ right to take part in 
the process earlier than before increasing the possibilities of an effective 
reorganization –but still keeping them in the centre of the procedure- or the variety of 
options offered by a plan such as: to converse creditors’ claims into equity (debt-to-
equity-swaps)40, reduce the company’s capital etc. More flexibility was granted to 
insolvency participants and even pre-insolvency proceedings were introduced. In 2013 
a new law regulated the strengthening of creditors’ position. The general comments 
from the German practice were positive though, as it created an environment of 
uniformity for creditors41. 
  It is supported that the efforts of reforming German law weren’t really successful, as 
it still is a unified system leading either to reorganization or liquidation (233 InsO) 
rather than two clearly different options, something that can only benefit the creditors 
and the reorganization plan is still in their hands. Attention should also be paid to 
Article 15 InsO according to which directors are held liable if they don’t file for 
insolvency three weeks after cash-flow or sheet imbalance, which is a time limit 
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objectively belated in order to draft an efficient restructuring plan. It is also accepted 
that liquidation and the natural consequence of the stronger companies eliminating 
the weaker ones42 is promoted by Insolvenzordnung’s provisions. For example, in 2010 
there were 136.000 filings for insolvency procedures and only 2.000 of them resulted 
to business continuation. Furthermore, the German Insolvency Law still has a long way 
to go as many of its critics support that group insolvency legislation needs to be 
developed following U.S.A.’s path and that an English-style ‘Scheme of Arrangement’ 
needs to be regulated. It is also the jurisdiction providing the most protection to 
security creditors, without publicity and registration being required and their securities 
are fully enforceable43. These are some of the reasons why out-of-court negotiation 
procedures are still a popular option in the German business world, with 20-30% of 
insolvent companies trying this solution before anything else. 
  The distinction between pro-creditor and pro-debtor systems may be gradually fading 
today as the effect of U.S.A.’s Chapter 11 is obvious in all European legislations but it 
cannot be denied that even though restructuring gained importance in Germany, the 
leading roles still belong to the administrator and the creditors. The negative approach 
towards insolvency also needs to change in order to gain every positive result the new 
laws can offer, as it is common for companies to avoid even the very helpful Umbrella 
Proceedings under the fear of negative publicity44. 
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43 J L Westbrook, C D Booth, C G Paulus and H Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) pages 12-24 
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3.2. France. Europe’s Rebel Drawing Back? 
 
  Ordonnance de Commerce (1673) was France’s first unified commercial code. 
Chapter 11 of this code formed the basis on which the codes of 1807 and 1838 were 
founded and some of their elements are still reflected in various national insolvency 
systems45. Articles L610.1–L680.7 of the Frech Commercial Code refer to insolvency 
and with the laws of 1967, 1984, 2005, 2010 and 2015 great reforms were 
introduced46. 
  A variety of procedural options, aiming to business rescue and mainly focused on an 
early stage of recession is offered to merchants in economic distress. More specifically, 
there are court-assisted (conciliation and mediation) and court-driven (safeguard 
proceedings, accelerated financial safeguard proceedings, accelerated safeguard 
proceedings, judicial settlement-reorganization and liquidation) procedures. 
  In more detail, conciliation (procedure de conciliation – L611.1-L611.16) is a 
procedure offered to companies facing financial problems for not more than forty-five 
days and it can have a maximum duration of five months. The debtor confidentially 
negotiates his debts with the assitstance of a conciliator and any agreement reached 
must be ratified by the relevant Commercial Court. The important element is that the 
management remains in the debtor’s hands. Mediation (mandat ad hoc – R611.18-
R611.21.1) is an informal and flexible procedure without time limits, according to 
which the court appoints a mediator as an advisor after the debtor’s request. It solves 
specific problems and not a general financial distress, with the only prerequisite being 
the company’s solvency47. Of course, during both procedures creditors can 
independently act in order to receive repaiment. In the safeguard proceedings 
(sauvegarde – L620.1-L627.4) there is a solvent debtor focused on restructuring his 
commercial activity under the condition that creditors’ majority -in number and value- 
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approves his plan. After 2014 the creditors’ position improved and each of them can 
propose a plan as well48. They cannot enforce individual enforcement measures in 
order to satisfy their claims though for a period of six to eighteen months and during 
this period an administrator is in control of the property. It is claimed that a balance is 
gained between judicial control and personal negotiations in this solution49. 
Accelerated financial safeguard proceedings (sauvegarde financière accélérée - 
L.628.1-L.628.7) are influenced by U.S.A.’s Chapter 11 and they also bear many 
similarities to the abovementioned procedures but they are imposed only on large 
firms and in shorter time frames (duration of maximum two months), implementing 
already agreed-upon restructuring plans and a conciliation procedure is compulsory to 
have taken place before.  The accelerated safeguard proceedings (sauvegarde 
accélérée - L.233.16) bear many similarities to the aforementioned ones as well (the 
creditor’s majority has to approve the proposed plan, prior conciliation is compulsory 
etc) with the difference that they can be applied on insolvent -for a period no longer 
than forty-five days- debtors too. Reorganization (adressement judicaire – L631.1-
L631.22) is the least amended procedure but its significance is being questioned during 
the last years since it tends not to be preferred by companies in distress50. The rules 
regarding the plan’s acceptance are the same as in the abovementioned procedures 
but it is slower and court-driven, with the administrator mainly controlling the 
process51. Lastly, liquidation (liquidation judicaire - L640.1-L640.6)52 is initiated by the 
debtor, his creditors, the district attorney or the court53 and during this procedure the 
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debtor isn’t of course in charge of his property54. The assets or the whole company are 
sold in order to satisfy the creditors, always according to the order of priority55. 
  From the above short presentation, a rough conclusion that can be drawn is that the 
French system is a pro-debtor system offering a varitety of options, a characteristic 
that was enhanced by the 2005 reform which aimed to create a legal environment 
similar to U.S.A.’s Chapter 1156. Nevertheless in 2014 another reform took place, 
promoting pro-creditor elements57 (such elements were presented even from the 1994 
reform), such as the creditors’ right to present a restructuring plan for the in-debt 
company. 
  Roughly, the entities having a role in French insolvency proceedings are the following: 
during safeguard and reorganization proceedings there is a preliminary (juge commis) 
and a supervisory judge (juge commissaire), a creditors’ representative (mandataire 
judiciaire) and an administrator (administrateur judiciaire), who are legal experts, and 
the commissioner of the plan, who can either be the creditors’ representative or the 
administrator. Regarding stakeholders, not all categories of them are represented 
during the proceedings. The legislator regulates for the controllers who assist the 
administrator and the supervisory judge, the creditors’ committees -usually in large 
corporate insolvencies- and the employees’ representative. During liquidation 
proceedings, and since there isn’t a rescue possibility, the creditors’ committees don’t 
take part, nor does an administrator exist and the debtor is represented by a liquidator 
who can be a former creditors’ representative58. A reference should also be made to 
some other ‘key players’ that have a specific role, for example public officers (notaries, 
auctioneers etc) and scientific experts. 
  Regarding creditors in collective proceedings, they generally must file their claims. 
The creditors’ representative organizes a list of claims that has to be approved by the 
supervisory judge and any interested party can appeal within thirty days from the 
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insolvency decision’s publication. The debtor has to propose a settlement of payments 
and despite the fact that reduction of liabilities is always the aim, it is difficult to be 
met in practice and only in special circumstances, such as the creditor being a public 
authority or the parent company, can such a result be achieved. In the case of a plan, 
creditors receive partial payments for the whole period that it covers. The first 
payment can be submitted within a year from the plan’s ratification and there is no 
mandatory minimum amount for it, something that is unusual and really beneficial for 
the debtor. Of course, the principle of creditor equality has to be respected59. 
  Even though liquidation is rarely followed directly, without reorganization or 
safeguard proceedings having previously failed, it remains a harsh condition according 
to which creditors must be compensated from the sale of assets or even of the whole 
company, the claims are accelerated and become immediately payable and the priority 
of them is fixed (pre-insolvency employee wages60, legal costs, post-insolvency debts, 
pre-insolvency claims guaranteed by security over real property, post-insolvency 
employee wages, current contract claims, pre-insolvency claims secured by general 
liens, unsecured creditors). It is important to mention the category of creditors that 
can claim their property back within three months from the publication of the 
insolvency decision, as owners of personal property that is in the debtor’s hands and if 
this is not possible, they can seek payment from a third party. 
  Employees also hold a significant position in French law. They are considered to be 
creditors for their wages and compensation and they are not required to file their 
claims as they have a general lien over the debtor’s property which stands for their last 
six months of work. Since 1973 a priority right has been founded which puts 
employees first, even above the secured creditors, and it stands for the last sixty days 
of their work. All the above though aren’t easily fulfilled, as during safeguard 
proceedings it has to be proved that the debtor is not in a cessation of payments 
situation and on the other hand, during reorganization or liquidation the debtor is in 
such a harsh economic condition that the necessary amounts cannot be released. 
Another aspect is that employees also are a ‘disposable work force’ and in situations of 
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economic distress, mass redundancies can be observed. According to Labour Law 
though, an employee safeguard plan must be conducted, protecting them from 
possible law infringements. Its terms differ depending on whether the debtor has 
applied for safeguard proceedings, reorganization or liquidation but in general they 
own a well-protected position. 
  Guarantors cannot deny the satisfaction of individual claims that are secured by a 
guarantee on the sole legal basis of the commencement of insolvency proceedings. 
This rule though is subject to several exceptions in the cases of conciliation, safeguard 
proceedings or reorganization, allowing the guarantor to benefit from any possible 
beneficial terms that the debtor and his creditors have agreed upon. Only in the case 
of liquidation the guarantee is subject to stricter conditions and it has to be paid 
without any alterations. The guarantor can always demand repayment from the debtor 
at a later stage; a condition which is rarely satisfied though61. 
  Another important aspect of insolvency is the liability of directors of legal entities for 
actions that led to economic distress. Criminal sanctions and financial penalties are 
imposed on them if fault (L651.1-L651.4)62 or fraud are detected. The important 
element is the casual link between fault and loss63. The provisions aren’t as harsh as 
for example the relevant German provisions, leading the managers to usually violate 
the short fifteen-day-from-the-occurrence-of-insolvency filling period. 
  It is supported that one of the 2014 reform’s aims was to make French law more 
creditor-‘friendly’, since it used to be too ‘socially oriented’, focused on business 
reorganization and employment maintenance, something that discouraged creditors 
from taking part in court-driven insolvency proceedings64. For example, a pro-creditor 
provision declaring valid any claims that occurred before the insolvency decision and 
that were not submitted in due time and a provision that doesn’t declare liable 
creditors for any losses caused to the estate from the extension of their claims are 
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indicative examples of this change in strategy. Other examples are the creditors’ right 
in judicial safeguard proceedings to submit a plan to the creditors’ committees and the 
court or that the debtor’s plan cannot include debt reductions and contract alterations 
but only renegotiations of claims. Furthermore, creditors’ approval wasn’t needed for 
a plan to be accepted in the past, a situation that has changed today65. Regarding 
liquidation, the procedure is accelerated which is beneficial for creditors; for example, 
it can be closed even if litigation is still evolving or even if some assets remain. Also, a 
simpler system for filing was adopted, according to which if the debtor has listed a 
creditor’s claim the creditor doesn’t have to file it too in order to include it in the 
process, as was the case before. 
  It could be supported that French legislation, having a strong Labour and Trade Law 
tradition and due to socio-political reasons such as high unemployment, wasn’t 
favouring creditors66. In fact, a past survey had ranked France with the score of zero 
regarding creditor protection, whereas Germany had 3 and the U.K. 46768. Another 
survey about creditor recovery ranked France twelve points lower than Germany and 
twenty points lower than the U.K.69. On this basis, the latest reforms added some pro-
creditor elements to one of Europe’s most debtor-‘friendly’ Insolvency Codes under 
the pressure of not corresponding to the economic crisis and the market’s needs for 
investments70. Nevertheless, even if it has a long way to go from its strong court-driven 
character before reaching U.S.A’s debtor-controlled system, it still is a legislation 
promoting business continuation and it is very important that the 2005 reform was 
introduced before the global economic crisis occurred, providing French economy with 
important recession ‘antidotes’. 
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4. History of U.S.A. Insolvency Law. Basic Legal Texts 
 
  The legislators of U.S.A.’s Constitution (1787) declared their right to draft unified 
insolvency laws (Article 1) but since many states already had their own relative laws, 
only one law was instituted in 1800 having its roots in English legislation with harsh 
treatment towards debtors, even imposing the penalty of imprisonment. Nevertheless, 
there still was a necessity for unified legislation since most states’ laws were 
discriminatory against foreign debtors, creating barriers for inter-state commerce but 
only some sporadic federal insolvency laws were introduced by the Congress during 
the period of 1800-1878. Eventually, in 1898 permanent federal legislation was 
introduced. In the next paragraphs, the evolution is presented in detail. 
  During the period of 1792-1797 there was pressure in order to produce a common 
legal framework as economic distress had led debtors to imprisonment so in 1800 a 
Bankruptcy Act, similar to the 1732 English Act, was introduced. It was a strict pro-
creditor text though with a few debtor-positive elements (ex cooperative debtors 
could be granted debt discharge if the creditors’ majority approved it or the fact that 
even though fraudulent bankruptcy was a criminal offence, it was not punished by 
death penalty71). 
  In the nineteenth century, financial problems occurred to the railroad sector72 so 
equity receivership was introduced enabling a receiver to take control of the company 
after the debtor’s petition and to find buyers. In this way employee positions were 
maintained and a higher price could be achieved as well but in practice this legal tool 
was much abused. 
  In the following period imprisonment was minimized and it finally stopped by federal 
legislation in 183373 -today it is permitted only if fraud is detected-. In 1841 the second 
Bankruptcy Act was published, which was the first modern insolvency law74 and for the 
first time both merchant and non-merchant debtors could voluntarily initiate 
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proceedings and be granted a discharge. Even though the Act’s application produced 
results, creditor protection was eliminated and the procedure was mainly court-driven. 
Eventually it was abandoned two years later. In the following years of economic 
growth no important legislative efforts were made except from the 1867 Bankruptcy 
Act which was abandoned in 1878 due to low creditor protection and difficulties in the 
grant of debt discharge, even though many of its provisions were similar to the ones 
that are in force today. 
  In 1874 a great step forward was taken with the composition agreement, the modern 
reorganization plan’s predecessor, according to which the debtor could pay only a 
percentage of his debts over a certain period of time if the creditors’ majority 
approved so. The period of the next twenty years was the last one without permanent 
federal insolvency law, as the financial distress of 1884 and 1893 indicated once again 
the need to institute unified legislation. 
  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that followed was the beginning of permanent and 
‘liberal’ federal legislation even though it was difficult to overcome the scepticism 
against federalism after the Act of 186775 and the controversy on the matter of 
whether insolvency legislation should have a permanent or a temporary character. The 
legal text provided an easier grant of debt discharge and provisions regarding 
partnership insolvency76. 
  From the beginning of the twentieth century Congress’s objective was to eliminate 
the strong pro-debtor orientation of the Act but the Depression of 1920 and the fear of 
debtor abuse produced the opposite results. Especially during the period of 1933-1938 
many reorganization laws were voted with the most important one being the Chandler 
Act of 1938. In 1978 the Bankruptcy Reform Act resulted to the U.S.A. Bankruptcy 
Code of today, replacing the previous Act. It is noteworthy that these actions weren’t 
an abrupt response to a crisis but a stable evolution, contrary to the reasons that 
usually prompt legislative action in the EU. Administration matters were improved, 
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Chapter 13 was promoted (readjustment of individual debts) and a balance between 
creditors’ and debtors’ interests was attempted. 
  In the following years, laws of minor importance were voted such as the 1984 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act (BAFJA) which was a jurisdictional 
law of doubted value77 or the 1986 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and 
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act which created the Code’s Chapter 12. In the period of 
1990-1992 laws regarding ‘pre-packaged’ filings were voted78 and 1994 also brought 
minor substantive changes regarding the use of Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. 
  In 2005 President George W. Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCA), mainly regulating individual bankruptcies. 
According to it, debtors who still had the ability to pay should pay a certain amount of 
their debts immediately -with the exception of those that their income was lower than 
the average- and they would be discharged of their remaining debts. Matters also 
addressed by it were creditor protection, abusive filings, elimination of forum-
shopping, establishment of a balance between Chapters 7 and 1379 and the 
amendment of Chapter 11. It is also supported that creditors gained advantages (ex by 
the increased requirements in order to file for insolvency or to be granted a discharge, 
by limiting reorganization rights etc). 
  In 2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were voted and 
three years later the Federal Rule on Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 came in force 
regulating procedural matters and promoting reorganization80. 
  As American law’s historic progress shows, debtor relief had been in the centre of 
legislative activity even from the early years and, as it will be presented in the 
followings chapters, the American laws and especially the Code’s Chapter 11 have 
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influenced many legal systems worldwide81 as they try to promote entrepreneurship; 
an approach that derives from the capitalistic structure of U.S.A.’s economy82. 
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5. U.S.A.’s Insolvency Law and its Role in Reforming Other National Legal Regimes 
 
  As mentioned in the previous chapter U.S.A.’s Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (title 11 of 
the United States Code) is a unified legislation governing all insolvency filings in the 
country. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, introduced by the Supreme 
Court, and the state rules of every court govern the relevant procedural aspects. 
Chapters 1, 3 and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code have general provisions regulating all 
cases, whereas the rest of the chapters regulate special aspects of insolvency. 
  Chapter 1 provides definitions. Article 101 BC declares that insolvency isn’t a 
prerequisite in order to file for the Code’s protection and for a company aiming to be 
rescued it is crucial to be able to file at an early stage. Chapter 3 regulates 
administrative matters. An important provision is Article 327 BC that refers to lawyers 
handling such cases and declares that they must submit documents certifying their 
disinterest in them. Even if a lawyer isn’t directly connected to the parties he has to 
prove that his partners aren’t connected either. Such rules ensure a fair procedure83. 
Chapter 5 has provisions about accurately identifying the debtor’s assets and liabilities. 
  Chapter 7 describes the liquidation process in which, as in the European examples 
mentioned above, a trustee dissolves the insolvency estate and distributes the 
proceeds to the creditors according to their claims’ priority. Any individual unable to 
comply with his financial obligations and any business entity wanting to terminate its 
activity can opt for this but only individuals can receive a debt discharge under Article 
727 BC. The entities excepted from the Code are banking and insurance institutions, 
entities having no property in the U.S.A. and governmental units (109 BC).  
Liquidation’s advantages are speed and simplicity and they are the reasons it remains a 
popular option despite the various alternatives the law offers84. The truth is that the 
Code doesn’t promote Chapter 7 for companies. A company must face severe 
problems in order to apply for it and it usually does so only after Chapter 11’s 
procedure has failed (1112 BC). 
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  According to Articles 301 and 303 the debtor or his creditors -three creditors with 
‘bona fide’ and total claims of minimum 5.000 dollars- file an insolvency petition to the 
competent court of the district where the creditor has his principal place of business, 
which ceases individual enforcement actions against him (362 BC). A list of assets and 
liabilities, a document certifying his income and a list of contracts and tax return 
transcripts have to be submitted as well (521 BC, 1007.b Fed. R. of B. Pr.) and a trustee 
is appointed having the responsibility of keeping the procedure evolving. The company 
operates under his control only for the necessary liquidation actions. Between days 21-
40 after the filing, the trustee will call a creditors’ meeting and if there are non-exempt 
assets in order to proceed, the creditors file their claims in a ninety-day period after 
their first meeting (502 BC). The trustee can annul preferential transfers made to 
creditors within a ninety-day period prior to the filing (548 BC) and transfers made to 
partners or relatives during a one-year period prior to the filing (101.31, 101.54, 547, 
548 BC).  
  The proceeds from the liquidation of assets or the company as a going concern are 
distributed to the six classes of claims according to Article 726 BC85 (secured claims, 
super-priority claims, administrative claims, unsecured claims with priority, 
subordinated claims and equity interests). Each class must be paid in full before the 
next class is satisfied. Regarding secured creditors, they are paid first, having claims 
supported by collaterals, and their payment doesn’t derive from the estate but from 
their security. It is also important to note that if the collateral’s value is not enough in 
order to repay them in full, then for the rest of the value the amount is ranked as an 
unsecured claim; it is never annulled. Any remaining assets will satisfy the unsecured 
claims. Liquidation doesn’t differentiate significantly from foreign jurisdictions. 
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5.1. Getting to Know Chapter 11 
 
  On the other hand Chapter 11 focuses on the debtor, without of course disfavouring 
creditors, and it could be said that it is the centre of the American insolvency heritage. 
Almost any individual and business entity can file for Chapter 11 as well, which has 
many ‘success stories’ in its history as it has restructured important areas of the 
American economy (ex airlines, healthcare, telecommunications etc). Protecting 
companies as a whole, debt restructuring and creation of equity are within its goals. 
  In reorganisation usually a debtor-in-possession continues to manage the company 
filing monthly reports to the court (1101, 1106, 1107 BC) and not a trustee. A trustee is 
appointed only in the case of fraud, dishonesty or mismanagement from the debtor 
(1104.a BC). After the insolvency filing the debtor owns the exclusive right to propose 
a plan for the first 120 days, which can be extended for eighteen months (1121.b-d BC) 
and upon proposal there is a 180-day period -extendable for twenty months- for it to 
be accepted (1129 BC). According to Article 363 BC the company can operate during 
the restructuring period without special court permission; however, actions that are 
not part of its usual activity are not permitted. Furthermore, there is flexibility 
regarding transactions which means that according to Article 365 BC the debtor can 
decide upon the fulfilment or not of almost any executor contract.  
  The debtor’s plan must present each class’s repayment and the majority of each class 
-in number and value- must vote in favour of it and at least one impaired class. 
Administrative creditors are specially addressed, as they must be paid in cash and they 
also have the right to enter into negotiations with the debtor and alter their claims. 
The ‘Absolute Priority Rule’ has to be followed although Articles 1122 and 1123 BC 
provide flexibility to the debtor86. The law only declares that similar claims must form 
one class, which allows the debtor to usually create one class for all unsecured 
creditors -disfavouring some of them-, whereas each secured claim belongs to a 
separate class. The court confirms the plan if the abovementioned principle and the 
‘Best Interests of Creditors Test’ are satisfied. It is mandatory for the plan to include an 
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introduction with information on the financial situation and provisions regarding 
classification, voting and distribution. There also is the option of ‘pre-packaged plans’, 
which are agreed upon by the debtor and his creditors before the official filing. If the 
restructuring option is abandoned whatsoever, it is important that only the debtor can 
decide the alteration to Chapter 7. 
  As mentioned above, Article 362 BC introduces the automatic stay which is decisive in 
reorganization, as creditors’ prepetition claims are ceased in order to proceed to an 
effective reform –with the exceptions of governmental, environmental and other 
claims-8788. Court decisions, set-offs, liens are all ceased, facilitating the reform. Relief 
from the stay can be granted if a creditor’s collateral is at risk of being damaged89. 
Article 362 BC doesn’t apply on guarantors. 
  Regarding creditors, any creditor whose claim is not listed by the debtor or it is 
characterized as disputed must file a ‘proof of claim’ and attach supporting evidence 
(1111 BC, 3003.c.2 Fed. R. of B. Pr.). Furthermore, under Article 554 BC the debtor can 
deny a secured creditor’s right if the creditor hasn’t secured it as the law requires (the 
debtor’s ‘strong-arm powers’). Other important provisions regarding creditors are 
Articles 361 and 363 BC which declare that if ‘cash collateral’ is spent, secured 
creditors are entitled to additional ‘adequate’ protection, according to which the 
debtor can make periodic payments or provide additional liens. 
  Important organs of Chapter 11 are also the U.S.A. Trustee and the bankruptcy 
examiner who have similar supervisory roles and the creditors’ committee which is 
formed by the seven largest unsecured creditors, bearing an advisory role (1102, 1103 
BC). 
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5.2. The Criticism 
 
  Chapter 11 has also received severe critique. Contrary to the legislator’s approach 
who is giving incentives for all companies to apply for the chapter’s protection, some 
academics supported that a company should apply for it only under the condition that 
it has strong possibilities of viability otherwise the restructuring isn’t worthy of the 
time and effort and it is indicative of judicial irresponsibility, since the market’s 
competition and corruption are not taken under consideration. It is supported that 
judges should only confirm a plan if it is not likely to be followed by further 
reorganization or liquidation, a common scenario in the American practice90. As a 
scientific symposium of 2013 confirmed91, fifteen percent of companies undergoing a 
reorganization of Chapter 11 will file for protection again. Feasibility should form an 
implicit element of restructuring. 
  Even though Chapter 11 continues to have a significant role in the economy, other 
roles have been attributed to it as well, as the economy evolves and this may create 
problems92; for example the reform of a company at a level that it entirely changes its 
object (ex Borders and Blockbuster altering its activity from rental stores into online 
streaming services). In this way the market may be kept active but on the other hand a 
company like Blockbuster for example, with 1 billion dollars debt at the time of filing, 
completely changing its object in order to survive is a dangerous practice. 
  Another criticised use of Chapter 11 is using it as a mechanism in order to ensure that 
the assets will be sold at their highest price. Companies may even sell the assets 
before the procedure is over so Chapter 11 only offers a confirmation. In 2002 eight of 
the ten largest corporate filings used Chapter 11 in this way. 
  From 2000 the use of Chapter 11 as a mechanism in order to sell a company as a 
going concern, something that had only been a theoretical idea in the past, increased. 
                                                 
90 Ruth S Lee, ‘Corporate Reorganization as Corporate Reinvention. Borders and Blockbuster in Chapter 
11’ (2011) SSRN Electronic Journal https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1942126  
accessed 8 December 2016 pages 53-55 
91 Edward I Altman, ‘Revisiting the Recidivism. Chapter 22 Phenomenon in the U.S. Bankruptcy System’ 
(2014) 8 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law pages 1-2 
92 D G Baird and R K Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) SSRN Electronic Journal 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=359241 accessed 25 December 2016 page 4 
30 
 
In fact, half of 2002 Chapter 11 cases were company sales93 and in 2014 twenty-one 
large companies filed for it, with sixteen of them being sold as a going concern, altering 
the chapter’s philosophy94. 
  Another aspect of the issue is that plans are not always debtor-oriented as they may 
impose strict terms. For example the workforce may be reduced, the management 
may be replaced, a merger may take place or unprofitable assets and sectors may be 
abandoned. So the election of Chapter 11 over Chapter 7 doesn’t always equal 
prosperity for a company. 
  Serious critique has also been expressed about the result of reorganization not being 
selected by as many companies as the legislator would wish95. More than 500.000 
companies become insolvent every year in the U.S.A. and it is noteworthy that 
approximately only 10.000 file for Chapter 11; the majority of them being relatively 
small with asset value less than 100.000 dollars, something that doesn’t reflect the 
legislator’s basic objective, as in these cases the aim is usually not business rescue but 
to help the management restructure the company’s finance. Small companies often 
apply abusively and empirical evidence shows that half of these plans are not 
successful. 
  Remaining on the subject of small companies, it is true that the Code imposes stricter 
provisions upon small-business debtors, as is the case for individuals as well; for 
example regarding filing (109.g, 111, 362.d-e BC) or the extra documents which need 
to be submitted (302.1, 521 BC). Such debtors must make several filings to the court 
concerning their feasibility (308, 1116 BC) and they are also subject to additional 
supervision by the U.S.A. Trustee (586.a.7 BC). As it is supported, American law 
promotes trade and therefore it is more protective upon large companies, which is a 
problematic element indicating that maybe the legislator hasn’t seen Chapter 11’s 
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actual power. In small-company cases the court is more active as creditors prefer not 
to hold an active role and the deadlines are more realistic and achievable96. 
  Lastly, the legal changes in creditor control over a company that occurred in 1998 
shouldn’t be overlooked, as they allowed investor groups to gain important collaterals 
on assets and, therefore, to control the company’s access to money and pressure it. 
This phenomenon of creditors not aiming to establish cooperation and having goals 
that oppose to the debtor company’s goals is common during the recent years97. 
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5.3. The Reform 
 
  On the other hand it is supported that criticism on this chapter is not justified, as 
many surveys prove its positive economic results. For example data collected during 
the period of 1994-2002 indicates that the majority of insolvent companies opted for a 
Chapter 11 reorganization and in less than twelve months they were profitable 
again9899. 
  Nevertheless in 2014, when the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) presented the 
Final Report and Recommendations on the Reform of Chapter 11 it was obvious that 
after approximately thirty years the American laws needed to reform as well. 
  Some of the suggested reforms were the appointment of the estate neutral, a person 
appropriate to solve any disputes arising, and the impose of a sixty-day period during 
which asset sales are forbidden in order to allow the debtor to examine his 
restructuring options and not fall victim of bad market conditions. The Commission 
also suggested the courts to follow the ‘broad’ and not the ‘narrow’ view in the 
examination of assets, an approach leading to more property being included in the 
procedures and to the enhancement of the company’s value. Another important 
reform was the grant of more flexibility to the debtor regarding the abidance by the 
‘Absolute Priority Rule’ on the thought that an insolvent company needs financing, 
which parties outside of the procedure are more unwilling to provide –of course, 
always under the ‘Reasonable Markets Test’-. Last but not least, the grant of a 
‘guarantee’ to unsecured creditors who were just below the last class that received 
payment (‘immediately junior class’) was introduced. 
  American insolvency law continues to develop by enhancing the fair procedure’s, the 
debtor’s and the creditors’ protection. 
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5.4. The Alternatives and the ‘Restitution’ 
 
  Even though American Insolvency Law mainly focuses on the procedures regulated by 
the Bankruptcy Code, there are alternatives to Chapters 7 and 11 (305 BC). In U.S.A. 
the debtor is not obliged to follow the formal court procedures contrary to most 
European legislations where only non-insolvent debtors are allowed to follow the 
informal ones. These procedures are under the general category of ‘rehabilitation’. 
  These voluntary procedures are known as ‘work-out’ settlements and they can be 
initiated by either the debtor or his creditors, who will form a ‘steering committee’. 
They produce ‘forbearance agreements’ which are contracts between the debtor 
company and its creditors, bound to each state’s laws. Usually though only financial 
creditors are invited to the negotiations whereas suppliers, employees etc continue to 
be paid. They are divided into ‘composition’ and ‘extension agreements’.  In the first 
case the debt is reduced whereas in an extension agreement the debt’s maturity is 
extended100. 
  The usual ‘forbearance period’ lasts for a maximum of three weeks, extendable for 
thirty days, and it is automatically terminated if a creditor takes action in order to 
enforce his rights against the debtor.  
  Among their benefits are: less time and costs, less disruption of the company’s 
activities, no elimination of workforce, maintenance of the company’s management, 
maintenance of stability in order to negotiate, the company can proceed to actions 
that go beyond its common course, flexibility, avoidance of reputational damage etc. 
However there still are negative features such as no protection against creditors who 
want to follow their previous written agreements with the debtor, no legal method to 
oblige dissenting creditors to cooperate, difficulties in the case of many creditors and 
low liquidity, threat of abuse by participants, acceleration of payments, no tax 
reductions, etc101102. A survey sample of 174 insolvent firms over a three-year period 
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underlined that it is difficult to foresee the success or not in such cases which are 
subject to wide flexibility103. 
  The American Code provides debtor-oriented legislation, which can be even more 
beneficial to companies in distress than out-of-court pre-insolvency procedures are 
and this is the reason for such procedures being at low levels in the U.S.A.104105. The 
Code’s provisions provide creditors with incentives to finance the debtor (DIP 
financing), allow for a second Chapter 11 filing (‘Chapter 22’) and a ‘cramdown’ on 
dissenting creditors making the acceptance of the plan more possible to succeed etc. 
Generally, it is an innovative system of law, following closely the economy’s needs. 
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6. Indicative Case Law 
 
  As Professor James Shein has written, corporate insolvency is a ‘tool’ that can either 
be used by companiesas a shield in order to defend themselves from excessive debt or 
as a sword in order to dynamically terminate unbenefitable commercial relationships 
and to create a fresh start106. Every insolvency and restructuring story is different and 
it is connected to factors such as its causes and aims, but the way it will evole mainly 
depends on the relevant legislation of every jurisdiction. By the presentation of two 
examples I will try to compare U.S.A.’s and Germany’s latest restructuring laws and to 
draw conclusions on their efficiency. The comparison of other options such as 
liquidation wasn’t thought to be necessary, as the tendency worldwide is the 
legislative promotion of business continuation. 
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6.1. The General Motors Corporation Case. A Multi-Layered Example. 
 
  General Motors Corporation was founded in 1908 as a car manufacturing company 
and had always been one of the leading powers in American commerce. In 2000 
U.S.A.’s central banking system’s intervention in the stock market led to a recession 
which in turn created pressure on companies having to deal with excessive pension 
funds, such as GM. Furthermore a 10,6 billion-dollar capital loss in 2005, a great labor 
strike in 2007, the automotive crisis of 2008, high oil prices and the global financial 
crisis urged GM’s management to file for a Chapter 11 solution in 2009, aiming to 
benefit from its multi-utility and its aim of enhancing business value. By that time its 
debt was 172,81 billion dollars and its asset value only 82,29 billions. 
  GM’s debtor-in-possession filing aimed at a government-assisted reorganization, a 
common practice of large American companies. The first-day motions they filed to the 
court (Article 365 BC) were about employee payments and the sale of the company’s 
jets. According to the submitted plan they would also receive fifteen billion dollars 
from the United States Treasury -it was stated that the only alternative to that would 
have been liquidation- and a sale according to Article 363 BC would follow107. 
  According to the plan NGMCO Inc., a company owned by unsecured GM bondholders, 
worker funds and governments, purchased GM’s assets, trademark and operations, 
changing its name to ‘General Motors Company LLC’. This of course was a pre-
packaged agreement, as the approval was obtained prior to the submission of the 
plan, a common scenario in companies with complex branding. The ‘new GM’ had a 
separate legal personality from the ‘old’ one and it also stopped placing the GM brand 
on all of its brands, adopting the structure of a multiple-brand company. Furthermore 
it retained only four of the previous brands (Chevrolet, Cadillac, GMC and Buick) and it 
reduced its contractual agreements, factories and employees. 
  The ‘old’ GM was renamed ‘Motors Liquidation Company’. Regarding the sales of its 
multiple brands according to the plan’s terms, Hummer and Saturn failed to be sold, as 
sales as an insolvency measure aren’t easily achieved, so their manufacturing was 
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abandoned whereas Saab was sold delivering profits to the pre-petition creditors. The 
company continued the insolvency proceedings and it was divided into four trusts.  
  This is a good example of a flexible restructuring that used a variety of legal 
mechanisms, loyal to the tradition of American companies that refuse to ‘give up’ to 
liquidation. Even though the case needed complex handling, its negative results in the 
economy were controllable (ex activities outside of the U.S.A. and the normal 
operating activities remained untouched). Generally it was a pluralistic procedure that 
included a ‘pre-packaged’ plan, debtor-in-possession management, state funding, sales 
of assets (partial liquidation), multiple reductions, alteration of the previous approach 
to commercial activity and even a leasing of the company’s commercial identity, 
trademark and intellectual property rights (partial dissolution108). Today both ‘GMs’ as 
well as their subsidiaries operate profitably, as a constant proof of the American 
insolvency law system’s efficiency.
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6.2. The IVG Immobilien AG Case. A Hesitant but Promising Effort 
 
  IVG Immobilien AG was founded in 1916 as a coal and steel company, converting its 
services mainly to real estate in 1997. In 2013 the severe threat of bankruptcy 
occurred due to a decrease of demand for its buildings and to expensive constructions 
such as the ‘Squaire’ building109. During the same year the company filed a court 
petition for reorganization under self-administration, with its debt being 4,2 billion 
euros and its asset value 20 billions. 
  The plan proposed by the company was approved by the creditors who were 
powerful hedge funds such as Cerberus Capital Management, Marathon Asset 
Management, Morgan Stanley etc110111, as its terms were beneficial for them. They 
would be repaid through debt-to-equity swaps granting them shares with total value 
of 1,4 billion euros and making them IVG’s new owners with great controlling 
powers112 and even unsecured creditors would receive a repayment of approximately 
sixty percent. Furthermore, the plan provided for asset sales such as the company’s 
50% stake in London Gherkin tower which offered to the company 12 billion euros, 
management replacement, a 2,2 billion-euro debt reduction113, capital increase114, 
reduction of workforce and the separation of the company into three independent 
sub-companies (one for real estate, one for institutional funds and a third one for 
caverns). The basic criterion for the plan’s acceptance was the better compensation of 
creditors compared to the compensation they would have received under liquidation. 
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  The company’s plan made good use of Article 240 of the German Rules of Civil 
Procedure regarding the automatic stay, Article 245 allowing the cram-down of some 
creditors’ classes’ claims and Article 103 providing debtors the right to terminate 
contracts. In September 2014 the company successfully emerged free of debt 
obligations having restructured approximately 4 billion euros of debt115. IVG was saved 
but it was forced to proceed to tremendous changes. Creditor repayment was in the 
centre of reorganization leaving the company’s best interests second and causing 
disruption in the market.  
  IVG’s restructuring obviously benefited from the 2012 law reform116 that minimized 
the administrator’s role, enhanced creditor participation, promoted self-
administration and provided more negotiating freedom to the parties involved. These 
were all changes that allowed German law to handle complex cases even though it still 
lacks the speed and flexibility of the American and the English relevant legislation117. 
The most important aspect besides law reform though is the slow change in judicial 
approach as the courts started to become more receptive towards second corporate 
chances. At this time not many large restructurings had taken place and Bonn’s (IVG 
case), Offenburg’s and Düsseldorf’s courts took some brave steps towards the 
confrontation of judicial ‘conservatism’ through financial and operational 
restructurings of companies. 
  Even though today the German and the European economy face the same difficulties 
as the American, Europe’s law and practice are still far from being able to provide the 
same solutions. Nevertheless, it is positive that as time goes by legislators seem to be 
on the same path and it depends on the judicial forces to be in harmony from now on. 
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7. The Economic Perspective of the Liquidation vs Reorganization Dilemma and the 
Effects of Both Options in the Market 
 
  Corporate insolvencies are a dynamic phenomenon affecting societies in multiple 
ways causing increase of unemployment rates, decrease of consumers’ purchasing 
power and market inactivity. Many bankruptcies taking place during the same period 
of time may even cause an economic crisis and since such phenomena are often today 
internationally, it would be interesting to investigate which legislative approach on 
insolvency benefits the economy more. 
  Unfortunately, not many articles have been written on this matter and the majority of 
them refers to the internal effects on the procedure and not the external ones on the 
economy118119. Furthermore there is a disproportionate majority of American literature 
compared to the European available so it is not easy to gain a complete view on the 
matter of which jurisdiction follows the ‘wiser’ path. Insolvency systems need to be in 
the right direction, as entrepreneurs need second chances in order to take incentives 
but also their creditors need the safety that they will collect their claims in the best 
possible way. 
  A company filing for insolvency and opting for the solution of liquidation will stop 
operating and its assets will be distributed to various creditors. On the other hand 
under reorganization it will continue to operate and it will be restructured but it may 
still proceed to dismissals according to the plan. 
  From the previous chapters’ analysis it was shown that the second option offers 
reallocation of contractual obligations120, continuation of commerce, possible 
production of wealth and avoidance of market panic121. A dilemma often expressed is 
‘employment maintenance (reorganization) vs efficient use of assets (liquidation)‘ but 
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successful reorganizations include both aims. Furthermore, a principle often met in 
scientific literature is that if the assets still operate and have value together, they 
should be kept together. Surveys have also proved that companies having undergone 
reorganization are more profitable and benefit the economy more, compared to 
companies that have never been subject to such procedures122. On the contrary 
liquidation of assets can be noticed even in non-insolvency situations. The latest 
insolvency laws though, with the variety of their reorganizational ‘tools’, aim at turning 
a company’s pathogenic elements into knowledge123. 
  An example underlining this chapter’s point comes from the American academia. A 
survey showed that in cases filed under Chapter 11 the companies preserve 75% more 
of their financial value than they would have preserved under a Chapter 7 filing. It also 
showed that the full recovery rate for secured creditors was 72% in the first case and 
only 32% to 51% in the second case. Furthermore, according to the study in 95% of 
Chapter 7 cases the unsecured creditors receive nothing whereas under Chapter 11 
52% of them will receive repayment124. Even though it refers to internal insolvency 
results, it is indicative of reorganization’s advantages. 
  Individual bankruptcies can present another accurate example: One of the changes 
brought by the BAPCA law (2005) were the additional barriers for debtors in order to 
achieve a debt discharge in an effort to halt the Code’s strong pro-debtor approach. 
Consequently, debtors had to submit strict monthly repayments in a way that 
prevented them from returning to a normal circulation of earning and spending, 
causing an economic recess domino. 
  Of course it is also important to note that reorganization shall and can benefit 
creditors as well, as they have the option of voting against an unfair plan and 
alternatively if they believe in its success, they also believe that they will gain profit too 
in the future; and practice has shown that creditors do have the power to impose their 
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own terms125. Creditor protection should never be overlooked, as their recovery is a 
decisive factor helping companies to have access to stable financing126. 
  The answer to the title’s question has to be based on other factors as well, such as 
the costs of both options and who will have to bear them –unfortunately though, most 
studies include only the legal costs127-. Reorganization procedures have often been 
accused as being expensive (approximately 4,6 of the company’s market value) and 
hiding indirect costs128129. Economist Dean Meckling’s firm thesis is that a 
reorganization system must not be costly in order to be able to meet its goals130 and 
practice has shown that usually the costs are much lower than some support, at least 
in cases involving small firms131132. Furthermore reorganization procedures have also 
been characterized as time-consuming (1 to 2,8 years), especially in cases of complex 
capital structure but the majority of companies returns to full operation within a 
year133. It has also been claimed that reorganization in some jurisdictions does not 
protect small companies but the market’s rules show that usually in such cases, the 
company’s major ‘asset’ is its personal contact with customers; an ‘asset’ that is 
difficult to be ‘preserved’ in insolvency.134 
  A research from the University of Cantabria confirmed that in creditor-oriented 
insolvency systems there is greater loss of share value in firms, in comparison to 
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systems which promote business rescue, by examining firms facing the threat of 
insolvency in France, Germany, Spain and the U.K. during the period of 1990-2002135. 
Furthermore the last twenty years have shown that even the rescue of companies in 
harsh distress can benefit an economy battling with high unemployment rates136. 
  European justice is still reluctant in this field though and an example from the 
German market and the solar energy sector is indicative of this: Even though energy is 
a crucial branch of German commercial services and even though many of its major 
companies were battling with insolvency, most of them closed down, unable to benefit 
from the relevant legislation137138. 
  The answer to this subject is complex as it has to take into consideration each 
national economy’s needs and the solution that will be preferred is always relative to 
the causes of the distress. However, economic and legal surveys addressing the issue 
demonstrate reorganization mechanisms’ dynamic to benefit distressed companies, 
their creditors and national markets in the long term. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
  During the last years the interest in comparative corporate insolvency law has 
increased, as law’s connection to entrepreneurship is acknowledged more and more. 
This dissertation examined jurisdictions of very different legal traditions and what 
could be underlined as one of its major outcomes is the recent years’ international 
tendency towards pre-insolvency proceedings, reorganization and the provision of 
second chances to companies; a result also abetted by globalization that leads the 
national legal systems to converge and harmonize. 
  Conclusions are hard to be drawn as the economic factors that prompt legislative 
activity on this field are constantly changing and it is important to consider that 
insolvency law usually changes corresponding to the economy. My research shows 
that the ‘conservative’ legal system of Germany is slowly moving towards more debtor 
protection, introducing new procedures influenced by U.S.A.’s Bankruptcy Code and 
that France is trying to eliminate its previous strong debtor inclination with its latest 
reforms in order to walk in the same pace with the rest of Europe. On the other hand 
the U.S.A., enjoying an already complete and innovative legislation, hasn’t undergone 
many reforms during the recent years, continuing to be in the centre of the 
international insolvency ‘laboratory’139140 and to set the example for other jurisdictions 
to follow since the active American market helps it evolve and become more efficient. 
  In order to better estimate what makes an insolvency system more successful than 
others it is essential to evince its effect in the economy and to do so, besides an 
empirical research, it is necessary to proceed to an economic analysis of the legal rules 
-as it was done in the previous chapter-, a difficult venturing whatsoever for a legal 
scientist141142. It is supported that legislations with clear economic goals benefit a 
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society’s economy more143. The elements that shall be studied and were actually 
studied for this question are the issue of who controls the procedures, the provisions 
referring to debtor and creditor protection, the ranking of creditor claims, the 
maximization or not of the distressed company’s value etc. 
  Of course the perfect insolvency system doesn’t exist but from the above analysis the 
American system was presented as the most ‘mature’ one, offering the ‘safe harbors’ 
creditors may need, but mainly focusing on the continuation of commercial activity by 
creating a legal environment that provides second chances to struggling 
entrepreneurs144; a result that can be certified by its robust economy. The civil law 
systems, even though they may vary on several aspects, generally refuse to leave 
creditors without significant protection145. It has also been observed that countries 
with weak judicial proceedings usually offer strong creditor protection as a 
‘counterweight’ for the uncertainty. 
  Insolvency law is a law of obligations with the difficult dual purpose of satisfying the 
debtor and his creditors in order to encourage business risk. As the economic crisis 
deepens the challenges upon this legal field multiply; nevertheless nowadays, as the 
above analysis demonstrated, merchants and lawyers have at their disposal sufficient 
legal mechanisms. 
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